At this point, only pro-Russian Ukrainians support Minsk and put Western allies like France and Germany in the curious position of advocating a peace deal they negotiated, but which many see as a blessing for Putin and the separatists. It was widely agreed that a pro Minsk regulation made unwanted concessions to Russia. Indeed, for five years, Ukraine has waged a war against what Minsk demands: more autonomy and linguistic privileges for rebel regions that no longer enjoy other citizens after Russia`s annexation of the same autonomy of Crimea. Minsk could also make the Donbass – like Crimea – ripe for harvest. While Russia called Minsk-2 a diplomatic victory, the Ukrainians were more skeptical and unsure of the improvements the agreement would make. They feared that the agreement would give the separatists broad autonomy and allow them to deepen their relations with Russia. It was feared that Kiyv would take all political gaze into the Donbass – while leaving it to pay the bill. For these reasons, the suspicions of the agreements are profound, with allegations that the former KGB, who still works for the Kremlin, wrote the special status and amnesty of Minsk to provoke the patriotic pride of Ukraine and force the country to federalize or break. Negotiations loaded with loaded names only fuel such speculation; These include controversial former President Leonid Kuchma and oligarchs, who are also said to be close to Putin, such as Viktor Medvedchuk and Nestor Shufrych. The viability and credibility of the whole process is weak. Preparations for a Normandy-Four summit on Ukraine, to be held soon in Paris, are under way. But beyond haute cuisine, what will be on the table when the guides meet? The impact on Ukraine`s foreign policy would be considerable. A neutrality clause in the Constitution would exclude NATO membership.56 But the DNR and NRL would be able to sign agreements with other countries (Russia) and perhaps establish Russian military bases on their territories.57 New doubts would also surround European integration.
Acceptance of Russian requests could weaken the central authorities in Kiev to the point of making it impossible to implement the AA. In public, officials say there is no alternative to the Minsk agreements. But in the private sector, few see a chance to fully implement them. Ukraine and the West insist on a full ceasefire before advancing the political elements of the agreement. Russia, for its part, accuses Ukraine of not keeping its political promises. Ukraine`s President Petro Poroshenko stubbornly opposes an agreement that grants Moscow most of what it wanted, giving Kiev responsibility for separatist territories while giving them enough autonomy to hinder Ukraine`s Western integration. The working group meetings will continue in Minsk, but they are a vine leaf for real progress. Although the worst violence has subsided, skirmishes continue along the contact line. But the smouldering status quo is not peace and therefore does not guarantee that there will be no more war. But how could the conflict escalate? A victory for pro-Russian rebels in the 2019 Ukrainian elections could lead to this result, as well as a rapid growth of the far right and violent resistance in Minsk if Russia ever creates conditions in the Donbass that force Ukraine to implement the agreements. In both cases, radicals could be encouraged at both extremes, which could lead to protests or further violence outside the conflict zone, which Russian propaganda could use to continue to denigrate Ukraine as illiberal and ungovernable.
In addition to the fact that it is likely that the conflict will continue to freeze. In a sign of the decline in the credibility of the agreements, one of the original authors withdraws from his performance. Much of what finally emerges from the Minsk agreements comes from Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko`s June 2014 peace plan, on which he campaigned and won elections, at a time when peace noc